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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
Starting from the research assumption that the Corporate Governance 
Code issued by Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) aims at building an 
internationally attractive capital market in Romania, based on best 
practices, transparency and trust that encourages companies to build a 
strong relationship with their shareholders and other stakeholders, 
communicate effectively and transparently and show openness towards all 
potential investors, in this paper we would like to present the degree of 
compliance of the companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange with 
the principles and provisions of the Corporate Governance Code. The aim 
of this paper is achieved by presenting and commenting on the principles 
issued by the BSE regarding the corporate governance and by analysing 
the Corporate Governance Reports of the companies, presenting at the 
same time the compliance of the listed companies with these principles 
and provisions, by using the data issued in 2018 by the entities included in 
our study, namely the listed companies on the main market of the 
Bucharest Stock Exchange. Our analysis reflects that, although the 
provisions and principles of the Corporate Governance Code are not 
mandatory for the listed companies, they are largely implemented in the 
activity of companies because an efficient corporate governance system 
can represent a competitive advantage for any economic entity in the 
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Corporate governance is defined in the international literature (OECD, 2015) as the set of 
relationships between a company’s management and its stakeholders. The first definition of the 
concept dates back to 1992 and presents corporate governance as the set of rules by which companies 
are directed and controlled (Cadbury Report, 1992), trying to provide an answer to the question how 
shareholders are getting a return on their investment (La Porta et al., 2000). 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is one of the 
organisations that have been particularly involved in the implementation of certain provisions, 
structures and mechanisms of corporate governance, the developed principles being guidelines, rules 
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of good practice for the organisation of companies and their way of reporting relationships with third 
parties (O. Jula, 2017). An essential feature of the Corporate Governance Codes is that they are 
implemented on the basis of the “Comply or Explain” principle which discloses to the market clear, 
accurate and up-to-date information regarding the compliance of the listed companies with the 
corporate governance rules, avoiding the ”one size fits all” framework (Seidl et al., 2013). 
In other words, a good corporate governance can be translated through efficient rules, policies 
and procedures of business management, administration and control. It is essential for companies that 
want to reduce operational and financial risks, increase performance, open towards new markets and 
add more value to the relationship with their current and potential investors (Fulop. M, et al.2015). 
In Romania, the concept of corporate governance appeared at the beginning of the 2000s, being 
initially governed by the Code of Management and Administration of the Bucharest Stock Exchange. 
(Apostol C.,2015).  
According to BSE (2015), the purpose of the Corporate Governance Code is to create in Romania 
an internationally attractive capital market, based on best practices, transparency and trust. To achieve 
these goals, listed entities must  comply to a great extent with the principles and provisions elaborated 
by the Bucharest Stock Exchange. 
Researchers such as Vintilă G. and Moscu R. (2014) studied the level of compliance for 55 
entities listed on the BSE in 2013 and found that the degree of compliance with the Code of Corporate 
Governance of BSE is achieved at a rate of 70.6%, the lowest score is based on a result of 21.1% and 
the highest is 92.3%. Rose C. (2016) investigates the degree of Danish firm adherence to the Danish 
Code of Corporate Governance and analyzes whether a higher degree of comply or explain disclosure 
is related to firm performance. His analysis shows that there is a positive link between Return on 
Equity / Return on Assets and Danish firm total corporate governance comply or explain disclosure 
scores. In their study Madanoglua M et al. (2018) defends the view that the adoption of corporate 
governance provisions should not be seen as a detriment to firms' financial performance. Using a set-
theoretic method, such as the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), his findings revealed that 
there are three configurations of governance provisions that lead to superior financial performance. 
The purpose of this study is to present the results of an analysis carried out on the companies 
listed on the main market of the Bucharest Stock Exchange in order to measure their degree of 
compliance with the principles and provisions of the Corporate Governance Code developed by the 
BSE in relation to the aspects regarding the responsibilities of the Board of Directors in the case of the 
individually managed companies or of the Supervisory Board / Directorate in the dualistic system, the 
risk management system and the internal control, the fair reward and motivation of the members of 
these boards and the value added through the relationship with the current and potential investors. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS  
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In this paper we aim to measure the degree to which the companies listed on the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange (BSE) comply with the provisions and principles of the Corporate Governance Code 
developed by the BSE with regard to the responsibilities of the management, the risk management 
system and the internal control, the fair reward and motivation of the members of the Board of 
Directors or the Supervisory Board and the added value created through the relationship with the 
current and potential investors. 
By means of the corporate governance statement, included in the Annual Report in a separate 
section, the listed companies perform a self-assessment of how “the provisions to be observed” are 
met and outline the measures taken to comply with the aspects that are not fully met. The research 
methodology used, the observation, was based mainly on the analysis of the Annual Reports and of the 
Comply or Explain Statement published by the entities analysed in 2018. Out of the 87 companies 
included in the Monthly Bulletin drawn up by the BSE in December 2018, a document presenting the 
main stock market indicators of the listed companies, we excluded from our analysis the companies 
that incurred losses in 2018 and those that did not draw up the Comply or explain statement (the main 
source of our data), thus keeping a number of 61 companies. 
 
According to the Corporate Governance Code (BSE, 2015), the provisions and principles to be 
observed by the listed companies are structured in four sections, as follows: 
 
Figure 1. Sections of Corporate Governance Code 
Source: own projection after BSE 
 
Table 1. Corporate Governance principles and provisions 
Section A – Responsibilities 
A.1. All companies should have internal regulation of the Board which includes terms of 
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among  others, the General Principles of  Section A.  
A.2. Provisions for the management  of conflict of interest should be included in Board 
regulation. 
A.3. The Board of Directors or the Supervisory Board should have at least five 
members. 
A.4. The majority of the members of the Board of Directors should be non-executive. At 
least one member of the Board of Directors or Supervisory Board should be independent, in the 
case of Standard Tier companies. Not less than two  non-executive members of the Board of 
Directors or Supervisory Board should be independent, in the case of Premium Tier Companies. 
A.5. A Board member’s other relatively permanent professional commitments and 
engagements, including executive and non-executive Board positions in companies and not-for-
profit institutions, should be disclosed to shareholders and to potential investors before appointment 
and during his/her mandate. 
A.6. Any member of the Board should submit to the Board, information on any relationship 
with a shareholder who holds directly or indirectly, shares representing more than 5% of all voting 
rights. This obligation concerns any kind of relationship which may affect the position of the 
member on issues decided by the Board. 
A.7. The company should appoint a Board secretary responsible for supporting  the work of 
the Board. 
A.8. The corporate governance statement should inform on whether an evaluation of the Board 
has taken place under the leadership of the chairman or the nomination committee and, if it has, 
summarize key action points and changes resulting from it. The company should have a 
policy/guidance regarding the evaluation  of the Board containing the purpose, criteria and 
frequency of the evaluation process. 
A.9. The corporate governance statement should contain information on the number of 
meetings of the Board and the committees during the past year, attendance by directors (in person 
and in absentia) and a report of the Board and committees on their activities. 
A.10. The corporate governance statement should contain information on the precise number 
of the independent members of the Board of Directors or of the Supervisory Board. 
Section B - Risk management and internal control system 
B.1. The Board should set up an audit committee, and at least one member should be an 
independent non-executive. The majority of members, including the chairman, should have proven 
an adequate qualification relevant to the functions and responsibilities of the committee. At least 
one member of the audit committee should have proven and adequate auditing or accounting 
experience. In the case of Premium Tier companies, the audit committee should be composed of at 
least three members and the majority of the audit committee should be independent. 
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B.2. The audit committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive member. 
B.3. Among its responsibilities, the audit committee should undertake an annual 
assessment of the system of internal control. 
B.4. The assessment should consider the effectiveness and scope of the internal audit 
function, the adequacy  of risk management and internal control reports to the audit committee of 
the Board, management’s responsiveness and effectiveness in dealing with identified internal 
control failings or weaknesses and their submission  of relevant reports to the Board. 
B.5. The audit committee should review conflicts of interests in transactions of the 
company and its subsidiaries with related parties. 
B.6. The audit committee should evaluate the efficiency of the internal control system 
and risk management system. 
B.7. The audit committee should monitor the application of statutory and generally 
accepted standards of internal auditing. The audit committee should receive and evaluate the 
reports of the internal audit team. 
B.8. Whenever the Code mentions reviews or analysis to be exercised by the Audit 
Committee, these should be followed by cyclical (at least annual), or ad-hoc reports to be submitted 
to the Board afterwards. 
B.9. No shareholder may be given undue preference over other shareholders with regard 
to transactions and agreements made by the company with shareholders and their related parties. 
B.10. The Board should adopt a policy ensuring that any transaction of the company with 
any of the companies with which it has close relations, that is equal to or more than 5% of the net 
assets of the company (as stated in the latest financial report), should be approved by the Board 
following an obligatory opinion of the Board’s audit committee, and fairly disclosed to the 
shareholders and potential investors, to the extent that such transactions fall under the category of 
events subject to disclosure requirements. 
B.11. The internal audits should be carried out by a separate structural division (internal 
audit department) within the company or by retaining an independent third-party entity. 
B.12. To ensure the fulfillment of the core functions of the internal audit department, it 
should report functionally to the Board via the audit committee.  For administrative purposes and in 
the scope related to the obligations of the management to monitor and mitigate risks, it should 
report directly to the chief executive officer. 
Section C - Fair rewards and motivation 
C.1 The company should publish a remuneration policy on its website and include in its 
annual report a remuneration statement on the implementation of this policy during the annual 
period under review. 
Section D - Building value through investors’ relations 
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D.1. The company should have an Investor Relations function - indicated, by person (s) 
responsible or an organizational unit, to the general public. In addition to information required by 
legal provisions, the company should include on its corporate website a dedicated Investor 
Relations section, both in Romanian and English, with all relevant information of interest for 
investors 
D.2. A company should have an annual cash distribution or dividend policy, proposed 
by the CEO or the Management Board and adopted by the Board, as a set of directions the 
company intends to follow regarding the distribution of net profit.  The annual cash distribution or 
dividend policy principles should be published  on the corporate website. 
D.3. A company should have adopted a policy with respect to forecasts, whether they 
are distributed or not. Forecasts means the quantified conclusions of studies aimed at determining 
the total impact of a list of factors related to a future period (so called assumptions): by nature such 
a task is based upon a high level of uncertainty, with results sometimes significantly differing from 
forecasts initially presented. The policy should provide for the frequency, period envisaged, and 
content of forecasts. Forecasts, if published, may only be part of annual, semi-annual or quarterly 
reports. The forecast policy should be published on the corporate website 
D.4. The rules of general meetings of shareholders should not restrict the participation 
of shareholders in general meetings and the exercising of their rights. Amendments of the rules 
should take effect, at the earliest, as of the next general meeting of shareholders. 
D.5. The external auditors should attend the shareholders’ meetings when their reports 
are presented there. 
D.6. The Board should present to the annual general meeting of shareholders a brief 
assessment of the internal controls and significant risk management system, as well as opinions on 
issues subject to resolution at the general meeting. 
D.7. Any professional, consultant, expert or financial analyst may participate in the 
shareholders’ meeting upon prior invitation from the Chairman of the Board. Accredited journalists 
may also participate in the general meeting of shareholders, unless the Chairman of the Board 
decides otherwise 
D.8. The quarterly and semi-annual financial reports should include information in both 
Romanian and English regarding the key drivers influencing the change in sales, operating profit, 
net profit and other relevant financial indicators, both on quarter-on-quarter and year-on-year terms. 
D.9. A company should organize at least two meetings/conference calls with analysts 
and investors each year. The information presented on these occasions should be published in the 
IR section of the company website at the time of the meetings/ conference calls. 
D.10. If a company supports various forms of artistic and cultural expression, sport activities, 
educational or scientific activities, and considers the resulting impact on the innovativeness and 
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competitiveness of the company part of its business mission and development strategy, it should 
publish the policy guiding its activity in this area. 
Source: BSE Corporate Governance Code 
 
For the entities included in our study we used a scoring system that reflects the extent to which 
they comply with the provisions and principles presented above, thus transforming the enunciative 
data into numerical, quantitative data, in order to measure the companies' ability in implementing 
”good” corporate governance practices (Udo Braendle, 2019). Taking into account the fact that in the 
Comply or explain statement the companies have three options through a self-assessment that reflects 
the full compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance, the following table reflects the scoring 
system used according to the response published by the studied companies: 
 
Table 2. Conformity marks 
Conformity mark Significance 
3 Full compliance  with the principles and provisions 
1 Partial compliance 
0 Non-compliance 
Source: author’s own projection 
 
Considering the 4 sections of the Code and the proposed scoring system, for section A a company 
can obtain a maximum of 30 points, for section B a maximum of 36 points, for section C, 3 points and 
for section D a maximum of 30 points. In total, a company can sum up 99 points, which reflects total 
compliance in all sections of the Corporate Governance Code. For the studied companies, the 
maximum score that can be reached is 6,039 points. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The analysis of the Comply or explain statement made for each of the 61 entities studied in 
accordance with the scoring system, highlights the following level of conformity with the Code’s 
provisions and principles: 
 







Total CGC score 6.039 4.706 78% 
Section A score 1.830 1.487 81% 
Section B score 2.196 1.690 77% 
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Section C score 183 100 55% 
Section D score 1.830 1.429 78% 
Source: author’s own projection 
 
From the analysis carried out we can see that the studied entities comply to a great extent with the 
provisions of the Corporate Governance Code. The lowest result was obtained in section C, which 
refers to the remuneration policy which must be based on the fair reward and motivation for the 
members of the Council and for the CEO or the members of the Directorate. 45% of the studied 
entities do not publish the remuneration policy on the companies website and do not include 
information on its implementation in the Annual report. 
The section analysis of the level of compliance with the provisions and principles of the Code 
reflects the following: 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for section 
A 
Section A – conformity score 
Mean 24.3770 
Standard Error 0.8772 
Median 27 
Mode 30 
Standard Deviation 6.8511 








Source: own projection 
The mean of the scores obtained in section A is 24.38, with the median 27 and the mode 30. The 
lowest score obtained is 3, which reveals that out of the 61 companies under study some do not 
comply with the provisions of the Governance Code in terms of the existence of an internal operating 
regulation for the specialised committees or the composition, the independence and the quality of non-
executive members of the Board of Directors is not compliant with the requirements of the Code, there 
being no clear distinction between executive and non-executive members of the Board of Directors. 
The highest score and the maximum of the section, the value 30, is obtained by companies that fully 
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comply with the provisions of the code in terms of the responsibilities of the Board. Within this 
section, the model’s amplitude is 27 and it reflects the difference between the maximum and the 
minimum score obtained by the companies under study. 
 
Graphically, the results obtained by the studied entities regarding the level of compliance with the 
provisions of section A are reflected as follows: 
 
Figure 2. Conformity with section A 
Source: own projection 
From the previous figure we can see that out of the total of 183 points per section (full 
compliance of all the entities/section), the studied companies are approaching to this value, which 
means a satisfactory level of compliance with the provisions of the code. In a single section, A8, the 
results are below average, because most of the companies do not have a policy to evaluate the Council 
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Conformity with section A
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for section 
B 
Section B – conformity score 
Mean 27.7049 
Standard Error 1.4597 
Median 33 
Mode 36 
Standard Deviation 11.4007 
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Source: own projection 
 
The mean of the scores obtained in section B is 27.70, with the median 33 and the mode 36. The 
lowest score obtained is 0 which reveals that out of the 61 companies under study some do not comply 
with the provisions of the Governance Code in terms of establishing the Audit Committee to 
periodically examine the efficiency of the financial reporting, of the internal control and of the risk 
management system. Moreover, the companies neither comply with the principles of governance in 
terms of the independence and the non-executive independent member status for at least one person 
within the structure. The highest score and the maximum of the section, the value 36, is obtained by 
companies that fully comply with the provisions of the code. Within this section, the model’s 
amplitude is 36 and it reflects the difference between the maximum and the minimum score obtained 
by the companies under study. 
Graphically, the results obtained by the studied entities regarding the level of compliance with the 
provisions of section B are reflected as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3. Conformity with section B 
Source: own projection 
 
From the previous figure we can see that out of the total of 183 points per section (full 
compliance of all the entities/section), most entities obtain a score above average, which means a 
satisfactory level of compliance with the provisions of the code. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for 
section C 
Section C – conformity score 
Mean 1.6393 
Standard Error 0.1734 
Median 1 
Mode 3 
Standard Deviation 1.3544 
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Source: own projection 
 
The mean of the scores obtained in section C is 1.63, with the median 1 and the mode 3. The 
lowest score obtained is 0 which reveals that out of the 61 companies under study some do not comply 
with the provisions of the Governance Code regarding the publication of the principles and arguments 
underlying the remuneration policy of the members of the Board of Directors or of the members of the 
Directorate. The highest score and the maximum of the section, the value 3, is obtained by companies 
that fully comply with the provisions of the code. Within this section, the model’s amplitude is 3 and it 
reflects the difference between the maximum and the minimum score obtained by the companies under 
study. 
Graphically, the results obtained by the studied entities regarding the level of compliance with the 
provisions of section C are reflected as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. Conformity with section C 
Source: own projection 
 
In section C there is only one provision that must be respected by the listed entities which refers 
to the fair reward and motivation regarding the remuneration policy of the members of the Council and 
of the CEO, as well as of the members of the Directorate in the dualistic system. The results obtained 
reflect the above average compliance of the entities with the provisions of the code. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for section D 
Section D – conformity score 
Mean 23.4262 





Conformity with section C




Standard Deviation 5.9370 








Source: own projection 
 
The mean of the scores obtained in section D is 23.43, with the median 24 and the mode 30. The 
lowest score obtained is 5 which reveals that out of the 61 companies under study some do not comply 
with the provisions of the Governance Code regarding the organization of the investor relations 
service, the annual dividend distribution policy, forecasts, the participation of external auditors at the 
General Shareholders' Meetings when their reports appear on the agenda of the meetings, key factors 
influencing the development as well as publishing on the company's website the information presented 
during the annual meetings with analysts and investors. The highest score and the maximum of the 
section, the value 30, is obtained by companies that fully comply with the provisions of the code. 
Within this section, the model’s amplitude is 25 and it reflects the difference between the maximum 
and the minimum score obtained by the companies under study. 
 
Graphically, the results obtained by the studied entities regarding the level of compliance with the 
provisions of section D are reflected as follows: 
 
Figure 5. Conformity with section D 
Source: own projection 
 
From the previous figure we can see that out of the total of 183 points per section (full 
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level of compliance with the provisions of the code. Only one provision, D9, records a lower score, 
respectively the one that states that a company should organize at least two meetings/conference calls 
with analysts and investors each year and the information presented on these occasions should be 
published in the IR section of the company website. 
From a global perspective, the level of compliance with the provisions and principles of the code 
of the 61 studied entities is presented as follows: 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for total 
Corporate Governance score 
Total CGC score 
Mean 77.1475 
Standard Error 2.9027 
Median 86 
Mode 93 
Standard Deviation 22.6714 








Source: own projection 
 
The total mean of the scores obtained is 77.14 points out of a total of 99 points / entity with the 
median 86 and the mode 93. The lowest score obtained is 12 which reveals that out of the 61 
companies under study there are entities that comply to a very low extent with the provisions of the 
Governance Code on the 4 sections, respectively regarding the responsibilities of the management, the 
risk management system and the internal control, the just reward and motivation of the members of the 
Board of Directors or Supervision and the added value created through the relationship with current 
and potential investors. The highest score, the maximum, the value 99, is obtained by companies that 
fully comply with the provisions of the code. Within this section, the model’s amplitude is 87 and it 
reflects the difference between the maximum and the minimum score obtained by the companies under 
study. 
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In a general approach, we can state that the scores obtained by the companies included in the 
research reflect a high degree of compliance with the principles of corporate governance. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has focused on the compliance of the listed entities on Main Market of the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange with the Corporate Governance Code principles and provisions. 
After processing and analysing the data collected from the Comply or Explain Statement 
published by the listed entities included in the study, we can outline the following aspects regarding 
the degree of compliance with the principles of corporate governance: 
• the Comply or Explain statement reflects the extent to which the corporate governance rules 
are observed by the listed entities through a self-assessment that reflects the full compliance, partial 
compliance or non-compliance with the provisions of the Code. The statement can be included in the 
Annual Report or can be presented separately; 
• the implementation of the provisions and principles of the governance code ensures 
transparency, trust for both current and potential investors, as well as the fair treatment of shareholders 
in relation to the access to information because the statement describes the aspects regarding the 
administration and the control of the company; 
• we may notice the companies’ favourable perception on the need to adopt the principles of 
corporate governance; 
• as a consequence, we consider that the companies under study show a high degree of 
compliance with the principles of corporate governance developed by the BSE, thus understanding 
that good corporate governance can ensure the sustainable development of the company. 
The contribution of the current study is to provide information regarding Corporate governance in 
Romania and the degree of compliance with the principles and provisions of the listed entities. Our 
main research tool, the corporate governance index, calculated after a framework proposed by the 
authors for 61 listed entities in Romania reflects a high degree of compliance. We believe that the ease 
of access to additional funds, the increase of transparency in reporting, the sustainable development in 
the context of globalisation and the increase of the market value of the company are the benefits of an 
efficient corporate governance system that can represent a competitive advantage to any economic 
entity. 
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